Unruh Act Definition

The unruh civil rights act provides protection from discrimination by all business establishments in California, including housing and public accommodations. The term “business establishments” may include governmental and public entities as well.

The following are summary of the statute, jurisprudence, and case laws interpreting the definition of the Unruh Act. The actual statute Civil Code section 52 and case laws interpreting the statute are below this section.

All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, mental or physical disability, medical condition, genetic information, martial status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.

The language of the Unruh Civil Rights Act specifically outlaws discrimination in housing and public accommodations based on sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status. However, the California Supreme Court has held that protections under the Unruh Act are not necessarily restricted to these characteristics.

Discrimination by business establishments on the basis of sex is against the law. It is unlawful for any business that is open to the general public to discriminate against a patron based on any of the following classifications: sex, race, color, religion, age, ancestry, national origin, mental or physical disability, medical condition, genetic information, martial status, or sexual orientation. Unruh Act protection is not limited to these classifications. It is an Unruh Act violation for a business to offer special treatment, whether preferential or detrimental, to one class of patrons regardless of the business’ motives for doing so.

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Unruh Act Statute

The Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51-52), originally enacted in 1959, was designed to protect the rights of Californians from arbitrary discrimination and to guarantee their rights to full and equal access to all public accommodations regardless of sex.

California Civil Code Section 51 – known as the Unruh Act

(a) This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

(b) All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.

(c) This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person that is conditioned or limited by law or that is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status, or to persons regardless of their genetic information.

(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any construction, alteration, repair, structural or otherwise, or modification of any sort whatsoever, beyond that construction, alteration, repair, or modification that is otherwise required by other provisions of law, to any new or existing establishment, facility, building, improvement, or any other structure, nor shall anything in this section be construed to augment, restrict, or alter in any way the authority of the State Architect to require construction, alteration, repair, or modifications that the State Architect otherwise possesses pursuant to other laws.

(e) For purposes of this section:

(1) “Disability” means any mental or physical disability as defined in Sections 12926 and 12926.1 of the Government Code.

(2) (A) “Genetic information” means, with respect to any individual, information about any of the following:

(i) The individual’s genetic tests.

(ii) The genetic tests of family members of the individual.

(iii) The manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of the individual.

(B) “Genetic information” includes any request for, or receipt of, genetic services, or participation in clinical research that includes genetic services, by an individual or any family member of the individual.

(3) “Medical condition” has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (i) of Section 12926 of the Government Code.

(4) “Religion” includes all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice.

(5) “Sex” includes, but is not limited to, pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth. “Sex” also includes, but is not limited to, a person’s gender. “Gender” means sex, and includes a person’s gender identity and gender expression. “Gender expression” means a person’s gender-related appearance and behavior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.

(6) “Sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status” includes a perception that the person has any particular characteristic or characteristics within the listed categories or that the person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have, any particular characteristic or characteristics within the listed categories.

(7) “Sexual orientation” has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (s) of Section 12926 of the Government Code.

(f) A violation of the right of any individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of this section.

(g) Verification of immigration status and any discrimination based upon verified immigration status, where required by federal law, shall not constitute a violation of this section.

(h) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the provision of services or documents in a language other than English, beyond that which is otherwise required by other provisions of federal, state, or local law, including Section 1632.

(Amended by Stats. 2015, Ch. 282, Sec. 1. (SB 600) Effective January 1, 2016.)

Case Laws Interpreting the Unruh Act definition

“Here, the City was not acting as a business establishment. It was amending an already existing municipal code section to increase the minimum age of a responsible person from the age of 21 years to 30. The City was not directly discriminating against anyone and nothing in the plain language of the Unruh Civil Rights Act makes its provisions applicable to the actions taken by the City.” (Harrison v. City of Rancho Mirage (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 162, 175 [196 Cal.Rptr.3d 267].)
“[T]he protection against discrimination afforded by the Unruh Act applies to ‘all persons,’ and is not reserved for restricted categories of prohibited discrimination.” (Marina Point, Ltd., supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 736.)

“In addition to the particular forms of discrimination specifically outlawed by the Act (sex, race, color, etc.), courts have held the Act ‘prohibit[s] discrimination based on several classifications which are not specifically enumerated in the statute.’ These judicially recognized classifications include unconventional dress or physical appearance, families with children, homosexuality, and persons under 18.” (Hessians Motorcycle Club v. J.C. Flanagans (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 833, 836 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 552], internal citations omitted.)
“Race discrimination claims under . . . the Unruh Civil Rights Act follow the analytical framework established under federal employment law. Although coaches are different from ‘ordinary employers,’ the McDonnell Douglas framework strikes the appropriate balance in evaluating race discrimination claims brought by college athletes: …………………………………………………… ”.. (Mackey v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 661 [242 Cal.Rptr.3d 757], internal citations omitted.)
“The Act applies not merely in situations where businesses exclude individuals altogether, but also ‘where unequal treatment is the result of a business practice.’ ‘Unequal treatment includes offering price discounts on an arbitrary basis to certain classes of individuals.’ ” (Candelore, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1145-1146, internal citations omitted.)

“[T]he language and history of the Unruh Act indicate that the legislative object was to prohibit intentional discrimination in access to public accommodations. We have been directed to no authority, nor have we located any, that would justify extension of a disparate impact test, which has been developed and applied by the federal courts primarily in employment discrimination cases, to a general discrimination-in-public-accommodations statute like the Unruh Act. Although evidence of adverse impact on a particular group of persons may have probative value in public accommodations cases and should therefore be admitted in appropriate cases subject to the general rules of evidence, a plaintiff must nonetheless plead and prove a case of intentional discrimination to recover under the Act.” (Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1149.)
“Civil Code section 51, subdivision (f) states: ‘A violation of the right of any individual under the federal [ADA] shall also constitute a violation of this section.’ The ADA provides in pertinent part: ‘No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who . . . operates a place of public accommodation.’ The ADA defines discrimination as ‘a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.’ ” (Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1446 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 825], internal citations omitted.)
“On examining the language, statutory context, and history of section 51, subdivision (f), we conclude . . . [t]he Legislature’s intent in adding subdivision (f) was to provide disabled Californians injured by violations of the ADA with the remedies provided by section 52. A plaintiff who establishes a violation of the ADA, therefore, need not prove intentional discrimination in order to obtain damages under section 52.” (Munson, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 665.)

“ ‘Although the Unruh Act proscribes “any form of arbitrary discrimination,” certain types of discrimination have been denominated “reasonable” and, therefore, not arbitrary.’ Thus, for example, ‘legitimate business interests may justify limitations on consumer access to public accommodations.’ ” (Hankins v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 510, 520 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 684], internal citations omitted.)
“[T]he Act’s objective of prohibiting ‘unreasonable, arbitrary or invidious discrimination’ is fulfilled by examining whether a price differential reflects an ‘arbitrary, class-based generalization.’ . . . [A] policy treating age groups differently in this respect may be upheld, at least if the pricing policy (1) ostensibly provides a social benefit to the recipient group; (2) the recipient group is disadvantaged economically when compared to other groups paying full price; and (3) there is no invidious discrimination.” (Javorsky, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1399.)
“Discrimination may be reasonable, and not arbitrary, in light of the nature of the enterprise or its facilities, legitimate business interests (maintaining order, complying with legal requirements, and protecting business reputation or investment), and public policy supporting the disparate treatment.” (Javorsky, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1395.)
“Appellant is disabled as a matter of law not only because she is HIV positive, but also because it is undisputed that respondent ‘regarded or treated’ her as a person with a disability. The protection of the Unruh Civil Rights Act extends both to people who are currently living with a physical disability that limits a life activity and to those who are regarded by others as living with such a disability…. ‘Both the policy and language of the statute offer protection to a person who is not actually disabled, but is wrongly perceived to be. The statute’s plain language leads to the conclusion that the “regarded as” definition casts a broader net and protects any individual “regarded” or “treated” by an employer “as having, or having had, any physical condition that makes achievement of a major life activity difficult” or may do so in the future.’ Thus, even an HIVpositive person who is outwardly asymptomatic is protected by the Unruh Civil Rights Act.” (Maureen K. v. Tuschka (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 519, 529-530 [155 Cal.Rptr.3d 620], original italics, internal citations omitted.)
“Unruh Act issues have often been decided as questions of law on demurrer or summary judgment when the policy or practice of a business establishment is valid on its face because it bears a reasonable relation to commercial objectives appropriate to an enterprise serving the public.” (Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1165, internal citations omitted.)
“It is thus manifested by section 51 that all persons are entitled to the full and equal privilege of associating with others in any business establishment. And section 52, liberally interpreted, makes clear that discrimination by such a business establishment against one’s right of association on account of the associates’ color, is violative of the Act. It follows . . . that discrimination by a business establishment against persons on account of their association with others of the black race is actionable under the Act.” (Winchell v. English (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 125, 129 [133 Cal.Rptr. 20].)

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