Unruh Act

By: Douglas Wade, Attorney

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Overview

Civil Code – CIV 51.

(a) This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

(b) All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.

(c) This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person that is conditioned or limited by law or that is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status, or to persons regardless of their genetic information.

(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any construction, alteration, repair, structural or otherwise, or modification of any sort whatsoever, beyond that construction, alteration, repair, or modification that is otherwise required by other provisions of law, to any new or existing establishment, facility, building, improvement, or any other structure, nor shall anything in this section be construed to augment, restrict, or alter in any way the authority of the State Architect to require construction, alteration, repair, or modifications that the State Architect otherwise possesses pursuant to other laws.

(e) For purposes of this section:

(1) “Disability” means any mental or physical disability as defined in Sections 12926 and 12926.1 of the Government Code.

(2)

(A) “Genetic information” means, with respect to any individual, information about any of the following:

(i) The individual’s genetic tests.

(ii) The genetic tests of family members of the individual.

(iii) The manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of the individual.

(B) “Genetic information” includes any request for, or receipt of, genetic services, or participation in clinical research that includes genetic services, by an individual or any family member of the individual.

(C) “Genetic information” does not include information about the sex or age of any individual.

(3) “Medical condition” has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (i) of Section 12926 of the Government Code.

(4) “Religion” includes all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice.

(5) “Sex” includes, but is not limited to, pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth. “Sex” also includes, but is not limited to, a person’s gender. “Gender” means sex, and includes a person’s gender identity and gender expression. “Gender expression” means a person’s gender-related appearance and behavior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.

(6) “Sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status” includes a perception that the person has any particular characteristic or characteristics within the listed categories or that the person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have, any particular characteristic or characteristics within the listed categories.

(7) “Sexual orientation” has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (s) of Section 12926 of the Government Code.

(f) A violation of the right of any individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of this section.

(g) Verification of immigration status and any discrimination based upon verified immigration status, where required by federal law, shall not constitute a violation of this section.

(h) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the provision of services or documents in a language other than English, beyond that which is otherwise required by other provisions of federal, state, or local law, including Section 1632.

(Amended by Stats. 2015, Ch. 282, Sec. 1. (SB 600) Effective January 1, 2016.)


Reference: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV§ionNum=51

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Purpose

Intent of former section was to give all persons full and equal accommodations and privileges in places of accommodation and amusement “subject only to condition and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to all citizens.” McClain v. South Pasadena (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Nov. 22, 1957), 155 Cal. App. 2d 423, 318 P.2d 199, 1957 Cal. App. LEXIS 1304.

Purpose of section is to compel recognition of equality of citizens in right to peculiar service offered by agencies for accommodation and entertainment of public. Reed v. Hollywood Professional School (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 1959), 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 338 P.2d 633, 1959 Cal. App. LEXIS 2158.

Intent of section is to give all persons full and equal accommodations and privileges in places of public accommodation and amusement “subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to all citizens.” Gardner v. Vic Tanny Compton, Inc. (Cal. App. 2d Dist. July 7, 1960), 182 Cal. App. 2d 506, 6 Cal. Rptr. 490, 1960 Cal. App. LEXIS 2138.

Both the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Hawkins Act (former H & S C §§ 35700–35741, see now Gov C §§ 12900 et seq.) were designed to discourage discrimination, and it would be unreasonable to hold that provisions of Hawkins Act, related to only part of housing field, reflect intent to exclude from Unruh Act all discriminatory practices with respect to housing, including those that clearly come within terms of Unruh Act but were not covered by Hawkins Act. Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co. (Cal. Mar. 26, 1962), 57 Cal. 2d 463, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313, 1962 Cal. LEXIS 187.

Purpose of act is to prevent discrimination in business establishments on account of race or color. Don Wilson Builders v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Sept. 11, 1963), 220 Cal. App. 2d 77, 33 Cal. Rptr. 621, 1963 Cal. App. LEXIS 2230.

Under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC § 51), the specified kinds of discrimination—sex, color, race, religion, ancestry and national origin—serve only as illustrative, rather than restrictive, indicia of the bases of discrimination condemned; and both the history and language of the act disclose a clear design to interdict all arbitrary discrimination by a business enterprise. In re Cox (Cal. Oct. 1, 1970), 3 Cal. 3d 205, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992, 1970 Cal. LEXIS 201.

Under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC § 51), the specified kinds of discrimination—sex, color, race, religion, ancestry and national origin—serve only as illustrative, rather than restrictive, indicia of the bases of discrimination condemned; and both the history and language of the act disclose a clear design to interdict all arbitrary discrimination by a business enterprise. In re Cox (Cal. Oct. 1, 1970), 3 Cal. 3d 205, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992, 1970 Cal. LEXIS 201.

There is no single test for determining whether an establishment is in fact a private club or organization, and thus outside the scope of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC §§ 51 et seq.). However, selectivity is the essence of a private club. When there is a large membership or a policy of admission without any kind of investigation of the applicant, the logical conclusion is that membership is not selective. An organization with no limits on its membership and with no standards for admissibility is too unselective in its membership policies to be adjudicated a private club. This approach, focussing on exclusivity, ensures that private organizations remain protected. However, entities which are not in fact private must comply with the mandate of the Unruh Act. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Oct. 3, 1983), 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 1983 Cal. App. LEXIS 2233.

The primary purpose of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC §§ 51 et seq.) is to compel recognition of the equality of all persons in the right to the particular service offered by an organization or entity covered by the act. The act bars all types of arbitrary discrimination, and its reference to particular bases of discrimination is illustrative rather than restrictive. Moreover, the statute’s focus on the individual precludes the exclusion of persons based on a generalization about the class to which they belong. Nor can an exclusion be justified only on the ground that the presence of a class of persons does not accord with the nature of the organization or its facilities. However, an organization may promulgate reasonable deportment regulations that are rationally related to the services performed and the facilities provided. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Oct. 3, 1983), 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 1983 Cal. App. LEXIS 2233.

The Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC § 51, prohibiting arbitrary discrimination by business establishments) is clearly a declaration of California’s public policy mandate and objective that men and women be treated equally. Both its history and its language disclose a clear and large design to interdict all arbitrary discrimination by a business enterprise. That the act specifies particular kinds of discrimination—sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, and national origin—serves as illustrative rather than restrictive indicia of the type of conduct condemned. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Mar. 17, 1986), 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 1986 Cal. App. LEXIS 2722, aff’d, (U.S. May 4, 1987), 481 U.S. 537, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 95 L. Ed. 2d 474, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 5218.

The Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC §§ 51 et seq.) seeks to remedy arbitrary discrimination. It does not seek to remedy traditional wrongs arising out of tort or breach of contract, nor does it seek to remedy discrimination based on purely personal grounds. Frantz v. Blackwell (Cal. App. 6th Dist. Jan. 8, 1987), 189 Cal. App. 3d 91, 234 Cal. Rptr. 178, 1987 Cal. App. LEXIS 1357.

The conduct enumerated in the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CC § 51 (discrimination by business establishments), is illustrative rather than restrictive. Both the language of the statute and its history disclose a clear and large design to interdict all arbitrary discrimination by a business enterprise. It protects all persons from arbitrary discrimination and is not limited to a category of protected classes. Vaughn v. Hugo Neu Proler International (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Sept. 25, 1990), 223 Cal. App. 3d 1612, 273 Cal. Rptr. 426, 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS 1007.

The general antidiscriminatory objectives of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC §§ 51, 52) are much broader than the specific antidiscrimination principles underlying tit. VII (42 USCS § 2000e–2) and tit. VIII (42 USCS §§ 3601 et seq.). Those two federal laws, with their state counterparts (Gov C §§ 12900 et seq.), aim to eliminate discrimination solely in employment and housing as to enumerated classes of persons. They represent areas of special concern to Congress and the Legislature. The Unruh Civil Rights Act, however, aims to eliminate arbitrary discrimination in the provision of all business services to all persons. Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (Cal. Feb. 28, 1991), 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 278 Cal. Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 900.

Plaintiff’s claim that defendant doctors conspired to paint him as a child’s murderer by abuse in order to hide their own wrongdoing and resulting in his wrongful imprisonment did not fall within the purpose and scope of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. While it was clear his incarceration caused him certain disadvantages, it was not clear how defendants’ alleged conduct was coterminous with a business establishment discriminating against him arbitrarily or denying him public accommodations; therefore, his CC § 51 claim was dismissed. Marsh v. San Diego County (S.D. Cal. May 4, 2006), 432 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34609.

Particular Actions

Where the owner of a motion picture theater agreed to permit a producer to test a film before an audience limited to employees of the producer and representatives of the press, the owner, except as modified by the agreement, had the exclusive right to determine who should attend, and one who did not qualify as a member of either class of invitees was a trespasser, even if expressly invited by the producer. MacLeod v. Fox West Coast Theatres Corp. (Cal. Dec. 16, 1937), 10 Cal. 2d 383, 74 P.2d 276, 1937 Cal. LEXIS 491.

Certain rules formulated by the horse racing board under the authority of Business and Professions Code were valid insofar as they regulated a licensee and his employees in the conduct of races and wagering on the results thereof, but could not be invoked to enlarge the instances when the proprietor of a public racecourse could lawfully place restraints on the right of adult ticket–holding members of the public to attend the races and participate in wagering thereon. Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc. (Cal. Feb. 14, 1951), 36 Cal. 2d 734, 227 P.2d 449, 1951 Cal. LEXIS 222.

Services of physician are included within “services in all business establishments” to which all persons are entitled regardless of race or color under Unruh Civil Rights Act. Washington v. Blampin (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Apr. 22, 1964), 226 Cal. App. 2d 604, 38 Cal. Rptr. 235, 1964 Cal. App. LEXIS 1316.

There is no indication that the Legislature intended to broaden the scope of CC § 51, requiring equal accommodations in all business establishments, to include discriminations other than those made by a business establishment in the course of furnishing goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or customers. 2 Cal. 3d 493, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216, 1970 Cal. LEXIS 285.

A municipal trespass ordinance did not sanction any arbitrary exclusion of a would–be customer from the premises of a shopping center, where the ordinance specifically excluded from its application cases involving discriminatory practices prohibited by the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC § 51). In re Cox (Cal. Oct. 1, 1970), 3 Cal. 3d 205, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992, 1970 Cal. LEXIS 201.

The broad interdiction, under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC § 51) of all arbitrary discrimination in business establishments is not absolute, and a business enterprise may establish reasonable department regulations that are rationally related to the services performed and the facilities provided, and may insist that customers who damage property, injure others, or otherwise disrupt business should leave the premises. In re Cox (Cal. Oct. 1, 1970), 3 Cal. 3d 205, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992, 1970 Cal. LEXIS 201.

The statute providing for equal access to public accommodations (CC § 51), did not prohibit the owners of two gambling establishments from denying access to their premises to a patron who had cashed checks with them that had been dishonored because of insufficient funds during such time that her debt to them for cashing such checks remained unsatisfied. Moreover, justification continued to exist for the owners to exclude the patron even after satisfaction of the indebtedness, where it was known to them that the patron was a compulsive gambler who had manifested a propensity to gamble beyond her means to the extent of committing what was possibly an illegal act in cashing, for purposes relating to her gambling propensity, checks that were subject to being dishonored for insufficient funds, and where they knew her gambling propensity was having a detrimental effect on her well–being as well as that of her husband. A restriction by the owners excluding such a patron from their establishments would not have been arbitrary, but instead would have been a restriction reasonably related to the operation of the establishments that would have constituted good business and social practice. Wynn v. Monterey Club (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Nov. 5, 1980), 111 Cal. App. 3d 789, 168 Cal. Rptr. 878, 1980 Cal. App. LEXIS 2406.

Application of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC §§ 51 et seq.) to a federally chartered scouting organization did not violate the Federal Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2), since the federal charter empowered the organization to adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with state and federal law. Moreover, the Unruh Act was not in conflict with the organization’s charter. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Oct. 3, 1983), 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 1983 Cal. App. LEXIS 2233.

Differential treatment of students by fast food outlets and convenience stores violates the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC § 51). Discriminatory practices, including limiting the number of student patrons, restricting students to certain hours or portions of the premises, or levying a minimum charge on student purchases, are arbitrary and unlawful. Koire v. Metro Car Wash (Cal. Oct. 17, 1985), 40 Cal. 3d 24, 219 Cal. Rptr. 133, 707 P.2d 195, 1985 Cal. LEXIS 394.

In an action by a police officer alleging that his verbal ejectment by defendant staff attorney for a nonprofit public advocacy association from a public seminar about police espionage sponsored by the association was unlawful occupational discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC §§ 51 et seq.), the trial court properly found that the officer, who was on duty and attending the seminar to gather information about individuals or organizations, was nevertheless subject to the act’s protection. Police officers can bring actions for violations of their individual rights, even when the violations occur in the performance of their official duties; further, no valid distinction may be drawn in such an action between an officer merely on duty and one acting in his official capacity. Also, even assuming that the officer had engaged in improper surveillance, the attorney did not allege that as an affirmative defense nor cross–complain against the officer for violation of his civil rights; rather, he engaged in improper self–help. Long v. Valentino (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Dec. 22, 1989), 216 Cal. App. 3d 1287, 265 Cal. Rptr. 96, 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1369, cert. denied, (U.S. Oct. 1, 1990), 498 U.S. 855, 111 S. Ct. 152, 112 L. Ed. 2d 118, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 4206.

Under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC §§ 51 et seq.), a business establishment may place reasonable restrictions on its customers as long as the restrictions are rationally related to the services performed and the facilities provided. Vaughn v. Hugo Neu Proler International (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Sept. 25, 1990), 223 Cal. App. 3d 1612, 273 Cal. Rptr. 426, 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS 1007.

In a Jewish memorial chapel’s declaratory relief action seeking authorization to remove, from a cemetery it controlled, a gravestone containing a likeness of the decedent that violated the chapel’s rules and regulations and the contracts between the parties, the trial court correctly found that the decedent’s widow failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether the chapel’s rule against portraits on gravestones violated the widow’s right to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and privacy under Cal Const Art I § 1, or violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC § 51). The record showed that a legitimate dispute existed regarding whether Jewish law forbids portraits on monuments, the chapel was duly authorized to interpret Jewish law regarding burials, and, in the absence of fraud or collusion, the interpretation of Jewish law by an accredited body is accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, even if the decision affects a person’s civil rights or is arbitrary. Moreover, the prohibition against portraits was a nonfraudulent, reasonable exercise of the chapel’s authority to administer the cemetery property for the general good, and to make choices that may be against the wishes of some individuals. Sinai Memorial Chapel v. Dudler (Cal. App. 1st Dist. June 14, 1991), 231 Cal. App. 3d 190, 282 Cal. Rptr. 263, 1991 Cal. App. LEXIS 675.

The trial court properly denied a preliminary injunction sought by a member of the Church of Scientology seeking membership in a cult awareness network, and properly found the exclusion did not violate the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC § 51). Membership in the network was only open to families and former members of destructive groups and others committed to exposing such groups. A construction of the act that would bring the network within the meaning of “business establishment” would constitute an infringement on its members’ right of freedom of association for expressive purposes. Admitting Scientologists as members would impede the network’s ability to engage in protected activities and to disseminate its preferred views, in view of plaintiff’s purpose to inform the network about Scientology so as to challenge, if not change, its belief that Scientology was a destructive cult. Further, in light of the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const. Amend. I) and the religion clauses of the California Constitution (Cal Const Art I § 4), it was difficult to postulate any state interest that would justify application of the Unruh Civil Rights Act under the circumstances. Hart v. Cult Awareness Network (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Jan. 28, 1993), 13 Cal. App. 4th 777, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 705, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 175.

The expenditure of city funds on a city’s public works project is a municipal affair. Thus, it is within the purview of a chartered city’s ample autonomy over municipal affairs to enact a comprehensive program designed to achieve the fiscally sound purposes of competitive bidding. Competitive bidding laws are passed for the benefit and protection of the taxpaying public, not for the benefit and enrichment of bidders. Their purposes, among others, are to guard against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud, and corruption, to prevent the waste of public funds, and to obtain the best economic result for the public. Stacy & Witbeck, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (Cal. App. 1st Dist. July 17, 1995), 36 Cal. App. 4th 1074, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 1995 Cal. App. LEXIS 658.

In an action brought by parents of a child who was killed by a drunk driver against Mothers Against Drunk Driving for discrimination in banning the parents from membership because of their allegedly disruptive conduct, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant. Defendant, a national nonprofit corporation organized to stop drunk driving, proffered insufficient facts to meet its initial burden to show that it fell outside the ambit of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC § 51), on which the parents’ action was based. Among other things, the record did not establish facts regarding the number of paid officers and staff, whether the operation of defendant’s physical facilities were merely incidental to the maintenance of its objectives and programs, whether the payment of dues was common or unusual, and what benefits accrued to defendant’s members, all factors determinative of whether defendant was a “business establishment” covered by the act. Harris v. Mothers Against Drunk Driving (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Nov. 14, 1995), 40 Cal. App. 4th 16, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 1995 Cal. App. LEXIS 1126.

The trial court did not err in granting defendant restaurant owner summary judgment in a nonsmoker’s discrimination action brought under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC §§ 51 et seq.). The act does not afford protection to business patrons allegedly discriminated against for their status as nonsmokers. There is nothing in the act to suggest that its purpose is to address health and safety issues, rather its purpose is to prohibit certain forms of discrimination. Being a nonsmoker is not the type of immutable characteristic traditionally protected by the act; nor is nonsmoking unconventional behavior that requires protection. Also, even if defendant had no legitimate business interest in discriminating against plaintiff in this case, there may be legitimate business needs to discriminate against nonsmokers. For example, a restaurant owner, who complies with a local ordinance confining smoking to one area, may ask a nonsmoking patron, who objects to persons smoking in the designated area, to leave. In such a case, the particular business interests of the purveyor in maintaining order, complying with legal requirements, and protecting a business reputation or investment is sufficient to justify distinctions among its customers. Further, recognizing nonsmokers as a protected class would result in adverse consequences, such as placing businesses in a legal dilemma between smoking restrictions and the act. King v. Hofer (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Feb. 8, 1996), 42 Cal. App. 4th 678, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 719, 1996 Cal. App. LEXIS 111.

Under CC §§ 51 et seq., the district court did not err in dismissing an employee’s claim for denial of equal accommodation in a business establishment. The employee made no claim that the owner of the power plant, where the employer had a construction contract, had discriminated on any basis listed in the Unruh Act. Also, California’s courts construed the Act to prohibit only arbitrary exclusions from business establishments generally open to the public; and a nuclear power plant obviously did not fit that description. The employee had been barred from the plant by the owner for allegedly agreeing, in workplace conversations, to sell marijuana offsite. Mathis v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (9th Cir. Cal. Jan. 24, 1996), 75 F.3d 498, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1044.

In a physician’s action for racial discrimination, there were issues of fact whether she was an employee, but a prima facie case of retaliation and pretextual reasons was established. A cause of action for racial disqualification was not stated under Cal Const, art. 1, sec. 8; and an Unruh Act action could not be maintained. Strother v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group (9th Cir. Cal. Mar. 8, 1996), 79 F.3d 859, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 8711.

In a racial harassment action against a school district, the court, as to defendants’ entitlement to immunity under Gov C §§ 815 and 820.2, noted that a governmental immunity is a jurisdictional bar to a claim for money damages against a public entity or employee; and claims for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against public entities and public employees fell well within the immunities’ boundaries. The immunity was jurisdictional, requiring dismissal of those claims. However, on an Unruh Act claim, defendants argued that the statute prohibited only intentional discrimination, not negligence; plaintiff alleged facts regarding peer racial discrimination and the ensuing hostile educational environment; she also alleged efforts to notify and obtain assistance from school officials and their refusal to take any action in response. Those allegations of intentional discrimination sufficed to withstand a motion to dismiss the Unruh Act claim. Davison v. Santa Barbara High Sch. Dist. (C.D. Cal. May 11, 1998), 48 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22407.

A sports bar that denied admittance to members of two motorcycle clubs when they refused to comply with the bar’s policy requiring them to remove their “colors” before entering did not violate the Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC § 51). Plaintiffs’ exclusion from the bar was not discrimination based on unconventional appearance, since the only part of their outfit considered objectionable was the patch on their jackets signifying membership in a particular club. Further, the Act did not encompass discrimination based on the wearing of colors. The “no colors” rule was equally applicable to all persons and thus the admission policy at issue did not constitute the sort of discrimination which was meant to be precluded by the Act; the challenged policy also served the legitimate business interest of preventing fights. Finally, allowing a discrimination claim of this nature would lead to endless, increasingly frivolous challenges to dress codes and other neutral admission policies. Hessians Motorcycle Club v. J.C. Flanagans (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Jan. 29, 2001), 86 Cal. App. 4th 833, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552, 2001 Cal. App. LEXIS 65.

County fair’s enforcement of a dress code did not violate a patron’s right to full and equal accommodations under CC § 51(b) of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. However, the dress code’s ban of offensive slogans, insignia, or “gang colors” provided enforcement authorities almost unfettered license to decide what the code permitted and prohibited; without deciding if the code violated Cal Const Art I § 2, the court held that it was void for vagueness, facially overbroad, and its enforcement deprived the patron of a liberty interest in his personal dress and appearance protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Gatto v. County of Sonoma (Cal. App. 1st Dist. May 23, 2002), 98 Cal. App. 4th 744, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 4144.

Trial court should not have denied the medical center’s motion for summary adjudication on the insureds’ claim of violations of the Unruh Act, CC §§ 51, 52, as the insureds, as patient litigants, were not within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect. Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Apr. 17, 2003), 108 Cal. App. 4th 917, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 734.

Bus driver’s claim brought pursuant to the Unruh Act under CC § 51(b) failed as a matter of law because the California courts and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had consistently held that the Act had no application to employment discrimination claims; an amendment to CC § 51(f) did not alter the Ninth’s Circuit’s position that the Act’s protection did not extend to employment claims. Tannlund-McCoy v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway & Transp. Dist. (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2003), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13619.

California Government Claims Act, Gov C §§ 910 et seq., applied to a damage action claiming that enforcement of a county fair’s dress code denied a patron equal access to accommodations and services required by CC § 51(b) of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and extended the limitations period beyond the one–year specified in CCP § 340; because the patron filed the complaint within six months of the notice of the rejection of his claim, pursuant to Gov C § 911.8(b) and Gov C § 913(b), the claim was not time–barred. Gatto v. County of Sonoma (Cal. App. 1st Dist. May 23, 2002), 98 Cal. App. 4th 744, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 4144.

As a matter of law, county officials were not entitled to partial summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CC §§ 51–53, and the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov C §§ 12900–12995, as they related to their enforcement of an ordinance that imposed age restrictions on persons occupying dwelling units in certain areas. The qualified immunity available under Gov C §§ 820.4 and 820.6 was unavailable where the county officials failed to use due care and/or acted in bad faith or with malice and the officials failed to submit any evidence demonstrating that they acted without malice, or with due care or good faith. Gibson v. County of Riverside (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2002), 181 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5173.

In a class action lawsuit brought by television writers alleging age discrimination, allegations that talent agencies systematically refused to represent older writers seeking television writing opportunities were cognizable under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, CC § 51, as well as under CC § 51.5. Alch v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Sept. 14, 2004), 122 Cal. App. 4th 339, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 1531.

Non-profit corporation that sued defendants to redress alleged housing discrimination did not have standing to sue under CC § 51 of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, as standing under the Act is limited to “persons aggrieved” and public agency plaintiffs. Hous. Rights Ctr., Inc. v. Moskowitz (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2004), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28885.

In actions brought by plaintiffs, who represented a class of individuals who gathered voter signatures for initiatives, referenda, and recalls and registered voters for upcoming elections, which alleged that three retail businesses violated plaintiffs’ right to free speech, CC §§ 51 and 52, and B & P C § 17200 by preventing them from gathering signatures in front of the businesses’ stores that were located in commercial retail complexes, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the businesses where the undisputed evidence demonstrated the private nature of the property on which plaintiffs sought to gather signatures and further showed that the entrance area of the businesses’ stores did not function as a public forum where plaintiffs would be entitled to engage in expressive activities, as the stores’ invitation to the public was to purchase merchandise and no particular societal interest was promoted by using the stores for expressive activity. Because the businesses’ stores — including the store apron and perimeter areas — were not designed as public meeting spaces, and the businesses controlled the areas immediately outside their stores by using those areas to sell merchandise, the businesses’ interest in maintaining control over the area immediately in front of their stores outweighed society’s interest in using those areas as public fora. Van v. Target Corp. (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Sept. 11, 2007), 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 2007 Cal. App. LEXIS 1665.

University chancellor and athletic director were entitled to dismissal of an action filed by female student athletes who alleged discrimination in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CC § 51; the chancellor and athletic director were entitled to immunity under Gov C § 820.2 because a fair reading of the complaint revealed allegations that they made actual, conscious, and considered collective policy decisions regarding the provision of athletic opportunities to female students. Brust v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2007), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91303.

District court properly granted a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a physician’s claims against a hospital and its staff for alleged racial and sexual orientation discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act; California law required plaintiffs asserting claims under CC § 51 and CC § 51.5 to demonstrate that their relationship with the offending organization was similar to that of the customer in the customer-proprietor relationship, and the physician’s relationship with the hospital was materially indistinguishable from that of an employee, and therefore the physician’s allegations amounted to employment discrimination claims that were excluded from the protection of Unruh. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP (9th Cir. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008), 516 F.3d 759, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3098, op. withdrawn, (9th Cir. Cal. July 28, 2008), 534 F.3d 1116, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15993, sub. op., (9th Cir. Cal. July 28, 2008), 534 F.3d 1116, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15994.

Trial court did not err in granting chamber of commerce’s CCP § 425.16 motion to strike group’s claim that the chamber violated California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, CC § 51 et seq., by denying group’s applications to participate in chamber-sponsored events to commemorate the Chinese New Year, including a community street fair and flower market fair, where group had no probability of success on the claim because the fairs were expressive events and were entitled to exclude as participants those who wished to express their own discordant views; group could have held its own fair or attended the fairs and expressed its views verbally or by signs, pamphlets, or other paraphernalia, and had no right to insist on being included in the chamber’s expressive activity. U.S. Western Falun Dafa Assn. v. Chinese Chamber of Commerce (Cal. App. 1st Dist. May 30, 2008), 163 Cal. App. 4th 590, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 815.

Trial court did not err in granting chamber of commerce’s CCP § 425.16 motion to strike group’s claim that chamber violated California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act by denying group’s applications to participate in a chamber-sponsored parade to commemorate the Chinese New Year where group had no probability of success on the claim because the parade was expressive, and the First Amendment barred the government from compelling the chamber to include in the presentation of its message the very different political message communicated by the group; parade’s overall message was distilled from the individual presentations along the way, and each unit’s expression was perceived by spectators as part of the whole. U.S. Western Falun Dafa Assn. v. Chinese Chamber of Commerce (Cal. App. 1st Dist. May 30, 2008), 163 Cal. App. 4th 590, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 815.

District court properly granted a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a physician’s claims against a hospital and its staff for alleged racial and sexual orientation discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act; California law required plaintiffs asserting claims under CC § 51 and CC § 51.5 to demonstrate that their relationship with the offending organization was similar to that of the customer in the customer-proprietor relationship, and the physician’s relationship with the hospital was materially indistinguishable from that of an employee. Therefore, the physician’s allegations amounted to employment discrimination claims that were excluded from the protection of Unruh. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys. (9th Cir. Cal. July 28, 2008), 534 F.3d 1116, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15994.

Plaintiffs, U.S. citizens who paid nonresident tuition for enrollment at California’s public universities/colleges, who brought a class action lawsuit challenging the validity of Ed C § 68130.5 failed to show that trial court committed reversible error in dismissing their claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CC § 51 et seq. Martinez v. Regents of University of California (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Sept. 15, 2008), 166 Cal. App. 4th 1121, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 1425, modified, (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Oct. 7, 2008), 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 1568.

In a case in which plaintiff alleged that a homeowners association engaged in disability and religious discrimination, the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on the merits of the case at trial in part because his arguments were without merit and in part because they were not well made according to the established standards of appellate practice. Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Feb. 27, 2009), 172 Cal. App. 4th 857, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 726, 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 418.

Although plaintiffs alleged that a bank violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act by requiring that U.S. citizens provide a Social Security number to open a particular type of credit card account, while allowing foreign nationals to open such accounts with alternative forms of identification, the bank, as a matter of law, did not act arbitrarily. Distinction between the types of identification numbers required for U.S. citizens and foreign nationals was one created by federal law, not by the bank, and presumably reflected a determination that the alternative identification numbers which could be used by foreign nationals effectively served the same purposes as a Social Security number. Howe v. Bank of America N.A. (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Nov. 16, 2009), 179 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 1973.

In an action by disabled patrons against a fast-food restaurant franchisor for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C.S. § 12182 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CC § 51, and the California Disabled Persons Act, CC §§ 54, 54.1, the patrons were not entitled to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 class certification of a 92-store class; for purposes of commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), there was neither a common core of salient facts regarding what accessibility barriers each restaurant’s patrons faced nor a shared predicate legal issue of whether each restaurant’s facilities violated the ADA or California statutes because each location had unique facilities. Castaneda v. Burger King Corp. (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2009), 264 F.R.D. 557, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99084.

Terms of an arbitration clause in an anesthesiology contract entered into between a hospital and a medical group were, because of applicable rules limiting damages remedies, unconscionable, rendering the agreement to arbitrate unenforceable against the medical group’s anesthesiologists, who sued the hospital and the medical group for age and national origin discrimination. Suh v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Feb. 18, 2010), 181 Cal. App. 4th 1504, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 192.

Bank and employee were entitled to have stricken under the anti-SLAPP provision of CCP § 425.16 claims made by an account holder of race discrimination violations of the California Unruh and Bane Civil Rights Acts, CC §§ 51 et seq., and 52.1, regarding the employee calling the police because 31 U.S.C.S. § 5318 immunized the bank and employee in that the employee was convinced that the holder was engaged in fraudulent and suspicious activity. Henry v. Bank of Am. Corp. (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2010), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14561, aff’d, (9th Cir. Cal. Mar. 27, 2013), 522 Fed. Appx. 406, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 6129.

Female tenants did not have a claim against their landlord under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CC § 51, even though the resident manager of their apartment building entered their apartment in their absence, opened their dresser drawer, and removed and sniffed their underwear. That conduct had nothing to do with the denial of equal accommodations or facilities on the basis of sex. Ramirez v. Wong (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Oct. 6, 2010), 188 Cal. App. 4th 1480, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 1723.

In a case in which plaintiff alleged defendant, a car wash operator, denied him full and equal access to its business location in violation of the Disabled Persons Act and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law where plaintiff did not present any evidence showing that he suffered any difficulty, discomfort, or embarrassment as result of the placement and size of a restroom mirror. Mundy v. Pro-Thro Enterprises (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2011), 192 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 212.

Commercial lending institution, which also invested its own money in a borrower’s venture, did not violate the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, CC § 51, by declining to make a mezzanine loan to a limited liability company on the ground that one of its members was a felon because: (1) being a felon was not a personal characteristic similar to those enumerated in the Act; (2) the lending institution had legitimate business reasons justifying its decision—the repayment of the loan and making a return on its investment; and (3) the potential consequences of allowing the felon’s claim against the lending institution would improperly involve the courts in second-guessing the lending institution’s expertise in determining loan and investment criteria. Semler v. General Electric Capital Corp. (Cal. App. 2d Dist. May 6, 2011), 195 Cal. App. 4th 175, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 582, 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 547, reh’g granted, depublished, (Cal. App. 2d Dist. June 1, 2011), 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 763.

Commercial lending institution did not violate the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CC § 51, by denying a loan to, and by declining to invest in, a limited liability company where a member of its managing member was a felon. Semler v. General Electric Capital Corp. (Cal. App. 2d Dist. June 29, 2011), 196 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 794, 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 846.

Video programming provider’s motion to dismiss a hearing-impaired customer’s claims that a streaming library violated CC §§ 51(bf), 54.1(d) was dismissed where the streaming video library was a website, not an actual physical place, and under judicial precedent, it was not a place of public accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Cullen v. Netflix, Inc. (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2012), 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97884, dismissed, (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4246.

Hearing-impaired individual failed to state an independent CC § 51(b) claim against a video programming provider where allegations that the provider did not caption a meaningful amount of its streaming library at the rate consumers expected and its streaming library was not accessible to hearing-impaired individuals because only a small portion of it was subtitled described a policy with a disparate impact on hearing-impaired individuals, but did not describe willful, affirmative misconduct. Cullen v. Netflix, Inc. (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2012), 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97884, dismissed, (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4246.

Where an elderly man alleged that a city violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), summary judgment for the city was inappropriate because a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether the city denied access to a sidewalk on the basis of the man’s disability by permitting a private vendor’s display to completely block the existing curb ramp; the district court erred by granting summary judgment for the city on the claims under the California Disabled Persons Act and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Cohen v. City of Culver City (9th Cir. Cal. June 6, 2014), 754 F.3d 690, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 10555.

City was not acting as a business establishment where it was amending an already existing municipal code section for renting private homes as short-term vacation rentals to increase the minimum age of a responsible person for the rental from the age of 21 years to 30; the city was not directly discriminating against anyone, and nothing in the plain language of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act made its provisions applicable to the actions taken by the city. Harrison v. City of Rancho Mirage (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Dec. 18, 2015), 243 Cal. App. 4th 162, 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 2015 Cal. App. LEXIS 1131.

Individual with autism did not have a claim under the Unruh Act for disability discrimination by a public school district, even though Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (f), makes explicit that any violation of the ADA by a business establishment is also a violation of the Unruh Act, because the district was not a business establishment. Brennon B. v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Nov. 13, 2020), 271 Cal. Rptr. 3d 320, 57 Cal. App. 5th 367, 2020 Cal. App. LEXIS 1077.

Employee stated an Unruh Act claim for discrimination against a supplier and a presenter representing the supplier based on allegedly racist comments made to the employee during a presentation, even though the presentation was not open to the public. Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc. (Cal. App. 4th Dist. May 12, 2021), 278 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 64 Cal. App. 5th 138, 2021 Cal. App. LEXIS 395.