Unruh Act Law Defense Lawyer

What are the elements of the Unruh Act?

A plaintiff must prove: (1) plaintiff has standing; (2) he or she was denied full and equal privileges to, or otherwise discriminated against by, a business; (3) a motivating reason for the denial or discrimination was the business’ perception of plaintiff’s protected status; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the business’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.

1. Plaintiff’s Standing

To have standing to sue for discriminatory practices under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must tender the purchase price for a business’ services or products. (Surrey v. TrueBeginnings, LLC (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 414, 416.) A plaintiff must have a special interest that is concrete and actual rather than conjectural or hypothetical to have standing. (Id. at 417.)

There is no requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies.

Visitor to an online business sufficiently alleged injury for purposes of standing under the Unruh Civil Rights Act by alleging that the visitor intended to use the services provided by the business but was prevented from doing so by a discriminatory provision in its terms of service. Such a visit is akin to encountering an unattended facility; a visitor is not required to use or agree to use the facility, to pay or tender payment, or to ask for an exception to a discriminatory restriction. (White v. Square, Inc. (Cal. 2019), 250 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 446 P.3d 276.)

2. Denied Full and Equal Privileges by Business Establishment

“Business establishments” must be interpreted “in the broadest sense reasonably possible.” (Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boys Scouts of Am. (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 670, 696.)

The Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civil Code §51, prohibiting arbitrary discrimination by business establishments) does not cover truly private relationships. True private relationships are continuous, personal, and social and take place more or less outside public view. (Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1986), 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035)

The Unruh Civil Rights Act applies to any for-profit commercial enterprise and to non-profit entities that serve its owner’s or members’ business or economic interests. (Id.; see also O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn., supra, (condominium association), Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors (1986) 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035 [nonprofit civic association of business and professional men where a primary purpose of the organization was to promote the business interest of its members]; Stevens v. Optimum Health Inst. (S.D. Cal 2011) US Dist LEXIS 95372 (religious organization); Nat’l Fedn. of the Blind v. Target Corp., (N.D. Cal. 2007) 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 [retailer’s website a business establishment under Unruh Civil Rights Act]).

Intent Required: The California Supreme Court has ruled that this element requires proof of intentional discrimination, such that a policy that applies neutrally to all people, regardless of their characteristics, does not violate the Unruh Act. Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 1142 (1991).

Intent of Unruh Civil Rights Act is to give all persons full and equal accommodations and privileges in places of accommodation and amusement “subject only to condition and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to all citizens.” (McClain v. South Pasadena (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1957), 155 Cal. App. 2d 423, 318 P.2d 199.)

Purpose of Civil Code Section 51) is to compel recognition of equality of citizens in right to peculiar service offered by agencies for accommodation and entertainment of public. (Reed v. Hollywood Professional School Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1959), 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887.)

Exception: There is an exception to the intent requirement under the Unruh Act for conduct that violates the Americans With Disabilities Act. (See Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 665.)

3. Substantial Motivating Reason

“Substantial motivating reason” expresses causation between the protected classification and the defendant’s conduct. “Substantial motivating reason” has been held to be the appropriate standard under the Fair Employment and Housing Act to address the possibility of both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory motives. (See Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 232.)

Age Discrimination: Policy treating age groups differently under a price differential may be upheld if the pricing policy (1) ostensibly provides a social benefit to the recipient group; (2) the recipient group is disadvantaged economically when compared to other groups paying full price; and (3) there is no invidious discrimination. In those instances, public policy justifies the discrimination; legislative enactments are sufficient, but unnecessary, to evince the public policy. (Javorsky v. Western Athletic Clubs, Inc. (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2015), 242 Cal. App. 4th 1386.)

4. Plaintiff Suffered Harm

California Jury Instruction 3607 provides plaintiff’s damages as follows:

If you decide that [plaintiff] has proved [his/her] claim against [defendant], you also must decide how much money will reasonably compensate [him/her] for the harm. This compensation is called “damages.”

[Plaintiff] must prove the amount of [his/her] damages. However, [plaintiff] does not have to prove the exact amount of the harm or the exact amount of damages that will provide reasonable compensation for the harm. You must not speculate or guess in awarding damages.

The following are the specific items of damages claimed by [plaintiff]:
[Insert item(s) of claimed harm.]

In addition, you may award [plaintiff] up to three times the amount of [his/her] actual damages as a penalty against [defendant].

5. Business’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing harm

 “The substantial factor standard is relatively broad, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical. Thus, a force that plays only an “infinitesimal” or “theoretical” part in bringing about injury, damage, or loss is not a substantial factor. Still, a minor force that does cause harm is a substantial factor. This rule honors the principle of comparative fault.” (Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 79.)

 
Court’s Note: Elements 3 and 4 may be unnecessary if only the statutory minimum $4,000 award is sought. With regard to the Unruh Act (Cal. Civ. Code, § 51), which is also governed by Civil Code section 52(a), the California Supreme Court has held that a violation is per se injurious and that section 52 provides for minimum statutory damages for every violation regardless of the plaintiff’s actual damages. (See Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal.3d 24, 33.)

Statute of Limitations

Claims for denial of full and equal accommodations under the Unruh Civil Rights Act must be brought within two years of the alleged discrimination. (Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal. App. 4th 744, 754-760; Mitchell v. Sung, 816 F. Supp. 597, 602 (N.D. Cal 1993.)

Remedies

Damages

An Unruh Civil Rights Act plaintiff can recover: (1) special and general damages; (2) an amount no less than $4,000 and no more than three times the special and general damages up to a maximum of three times the special and general damages, but in no case less than $4,000; and (3) attorney’s fees for each violation of the Act.

Under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, a Plaintiff is entitled to recover actual damages and an amount up to three times the actual damages for each violation of the Unruh Act, “but in no case less than $4,000…” for each and every offense (Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a); Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 667.)  In order to maintain an action for these statutory minimum damages, “an individual must … [establish] that he or she was denied full and equal access on a particular occasion.” (Donald v. Cafe Royale Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 168, 183.)

A Plaintiff is entitled to $4,000 for each time he visits an establishment that contains architectural barriers that deny the Plaintiff of full and equal enjoyment of the premises (Feezor v. Del Taco, Inc. (2005) 431 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1091.)  “Such an interpretation is supported by case law and is consistent with the plain language of UCRA [Unruh Act].” Id. The Plaintiff need not establish that he was wholly excluded from enjoying the Defendant’s services, only that he was denied full and equal access (Hubbard v. Twin Oaks Health and Rehabilitation Center. (2004) 408 F.Supp.2d 923, 932.)

Injunctive Relief

Injunctive relief is also available under Cal. Civ. Code § 52(c). Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in conduct of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights described in this section, and that conduct is of that nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of those rights, the Attorney General, any district attorney or city attorney, or any person aggrieved by the conduct may bring a civil action in the appropriate court by filing with it a complaint. The complaint shall contain the following:

(1) The signature of the officer, or, in his or her absence, the individual acting on behalf of the officer, or the signature of the person aggrieved;

(2) The facts pertaining to the conduct; and

(3) A request for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the person or persons responsible for the conduct, as the complainant deems necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights described in this section.

Attorneys’ Fees

The Unruh Civil Rights Act authorizes “Attorney’s fees as may be determined by the court.” (Cal. Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (b)(3).) Similarly, the enforcement provisions of Section 54.1 specify: “The prevailing party in the action shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Cal. Civ. Code, § 55.)

Plaintiff’s claims for attorney’s fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C.S. § 12205 and state law were allowed in part as he was the prevailing party pursuant to accepting an offer of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 in an action under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Civil Code Section 51, H & S C § 19953, and the California Disabled Persons Act, Civil Code §§ 54- 55; they were denied as to unreasonable hours claimed, such as those spent regenerating form pleadings that had been used in dozens of other cases by his counsel, hours spent for clerical tasks, and those spent traveling between two cities where counsel tried equal amounts of cases in both places. Martinez v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.

Affirmative Defenses

No Standing

The Unruh Civil Rights Act was intended to provide recourse for individuals actually denied full and equal treatment by a business. (Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood Investors (1990) 221 Cal. App. 3d 1377, 1383 (emphasis added.) In 2008, the California Court of Appeal held that to have standing to sue for discriminatory practices under the Unruh Act, a plaintiff must tender the purchase price for a business’ services or products. (Surrey v. TrueBeginnings, LLC (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 414, 416.) Thus, for a plaintiff to have standing, he or she must have a special interest that is concrete and actual rather than conjectural or hypothetical. (Id. at 417.)

Reasonable Regulations Governing Customer Conduct

Customer or patron misconduct is not protected by the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  Business establishments have the right to adopt reasonable restrictions on its customers when those restrictions are rationally related to the business being conducted on the facilities. (Wynn v. Monterey Club (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 789.)

Similarly, a business may insist that customers who damage property, injure others, or otherwise disrupt business leave the premises. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 217 (1970).

No Construction Required

The Unruh Civil Rights Act does not require that a business construct, alter, or repair the premises beyond that construction that is otherwise required by other provisions of law. (Cal. Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (d).)

Limited Jurisdiction

Depending on the facts of the particular case, a defendant may argue that a verdict of $25,000 is “virtually unobtainable” and request a reclassification hearing to transfer the case from unlimited to limited jurisdiction. (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 257, 269.)