EEOC & FEHA Retaliation Law and Elements
The EEOC laws prohibit employers from punishing job applicants or employees for opposing harassment or discrimination.
The EEOC laws prohibit employers from punishing job applicants or employees for opposing harassment or discrimination.
The laws enforced by EEOC protect a job applicant or employee from being harassed, treated differently, or punished at work because you filed a job discrimination complaint. California law protects from retaliation employees who resist or object to discrimination or harassment. It is unlawful “[f]or any employer … or person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part.” (Gov. Code, §12940, subd. (h).)
The Fair Employment and Housing Act proscribes retaliation more broadly than discrimination. The general prohibition against discrimination extends only to discrimination “against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” In contrast, the prohibition against retaliation states simply that an employer may not “discriminate” against any employee who opposes discrimination. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1036.)
The California statute prohibiting retaliation is the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). (Gov. Code, § 12940, et seq.)
The federal counterpart to FEHA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq.), also protects against retaliation for employees who have opposed or resisted discrimination or harassment.
Because FEHA and Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 have the same anti-discrimination objectives and public policy purposes, California courts may rely on federal decisions to interpret analogous parts of the state statute. (Wade v. Ports America Management Corp. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 648, 652.)
An employer includes any person or entity regularly employing five or more persons. (Mathews v. Happy Valley Conference Center, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 236, 260, quoting Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (d).)
An agent is a person who represents another person or an entity in dealing with third persons. Under California law, agents of covered employers are also considered employers. (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (d).)
To determine whether someone is an agent of an employer, courts look at the amount of control the employer exercises over them. (Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 492.)
The state, cities, and any political or civil division of the state are covered employers. (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (d).)
A labor organization, like an employer, cannot discriminate on the basis of an individual’s religious creed.(Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).)
A “labor organization” includes any organization that exists and is constituted for the purpose, in whole or in part, of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning grievances, or terms or conditions of employment. (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (g).)
An employee of an entity subject to the FEHA is personally liable for any harassment prohibited that is perpetrated by the employee, regardless of whether the employer or covered entity knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. (Gov. Code §, 12940, subd. (j)(3).)
Note: This individual liability was only recently codified by the California Legislature after the California Supreme Court held in Reno v. Baird that individual employees are not liable under FEHA. Today, individual employees can be held liable.
Nonprofit religious associations and corporations are not covered employers. (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (d)(1).
An employee is someone who is both a person who works under the direction and control of the employer, and a person whom the employer has agreed to hire. (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (c).) However, the “FEHA does not define an employer, employee, or what constitutes employment.” (Shephard v. Loyola Marymount Univ. (2002) 102. Cal.App.4th 837, 842.)
Temporary workers are considered employees. (Bradley v. California Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1612.)
California law expressly extends its anti-discrimination protections to applicants for employment positions. Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Med. Ctr. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 138, 144.)
Unpaid interns represent one of the few positions in which a worker will have the right to be free from discrimination despite not being an employee. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subds. (c), (j), & (l).)
Volunteers are not protected under FEHA. (Mendoza v. Town of Ross (2005) Cal.App.4th 625.)
Person employed by their parents, spouse, or child are not protected under FEHA. (Mendoza v. Town of Ross (2005) Cal.App.4th 625, 632 [noting that FEHA excludes persons employed by close relatives].)
Independent contractors are not protected under FEHA because they do not work under the direct control and supervision of the employer. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(5).)
“Adverse employment action” is a shorthand expression for the kind, nature, or degree of action against an employee that is enough to state a claim. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 373.) Generally, the discrimination must adversely and materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of plaintiff’s employment. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).)
An adverse employment action is interpreted liberally by the court under a case-by-case analysis, and it must be substantial. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1053-1043.) Additionally. an adverse employment action may consist of a “series of subtle, yet damaging, injuries,” rather than a single actionable event. (Ibid.)
A protected activity may include: making a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any manner in proceedings or hearings under the statutes, or opposing acts made unlawful by FEHA. (Gov. Code, §12940, subd. (h).) For instance, it would be unlawful for an employer to terminate a worker who threatened to file a charge of employment discrimination against the employer, because to do so would constitute unlawful retaliation. (Iwekaogwu v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 75 CA4th 803, 815.)
An employer may not terminate an employee because he or she attempted to stop one subordinate from sexually harassing another subordinate. (Flait v. North American Watch Co. (1992) 3 Cal. App. 4th 467, 472.)
An employer may not fire an employee who refuses to “Americanize” a predominately foreign workforce. (Blom v. N.G.K. Spark Plugs (USA), Inc. (1992) 3 Cal. App. 4th 382.)
An employer may not retaliate against a former employee who filed a complaint of discrimination by providing a negative reference to a prospective employer. (Hashimoto v. Dalton (9th Cir. 1997) 118 F.3d 671.)
An employer may not retaliate against an employee who refuses to write up a poor performance evaluation on an employee who is the victim of unlawful discrimination. (Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th 1038; Casenas v. Fujisawa USA, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal. App. 4th 101.)
“Both direct and circumstantial evidence can be used to show an employer’s intent to retaliate. ‘Direct evidence of retaliation may consist of remarks made by decision makers displaying a retaliatory motive.’ Circumstantial evidence typically relates to such factors as the plaintiff’s job performance, the timing of events, and how the plaintiff was treated in comparison to other workers.” (Colarossi v. Coty US Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1153.)
“The retaliatory motive is ‘proved by showing that plaintiff engaged in protected activities, that his employer was aware of the protected activities, and that the adverse action followed within a relatively short time thereafter.’ ‘The causal link may be established by an inference derived from circumstantial evidence, “such as the employer’s knowledge that the [employee] engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and allegedly retaliatory employment decision.” ’ ” (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 615.)
Must Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Before filing a statutory retaliation claim, the employee must exhaust available administrative remedies by filing a charge of retaliation with the California Department of Fair Employment & Housing (“DFEH”). (Gov. Code, § 12960.)
The employee must file an administrative charge of retaliation within one year of the date of the retaliatory acts. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprives a court of jurisdiction over a subsequent complaint of retaliation. (Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1121-22.)
If the employee has already filed an administrative charge and later claims that the employer retaliated in response, the employee must amend the administrative charge or file a new one. (Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co. (1995) 36 Cal. App. 4th 1607; Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 Cal. App. 4th 1718, 1724. 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 183 (1994).
A second charge with the DFEH alleging retaliation because the employee had complained of discrimination is sufficient to support a claim for retaliation in court, even if the charge fails to specify that the employer engaged in retaliation against the plaintiff for filing the lawsuit. Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, 51 Cal. App. 4th 345, 382.)
The employee must file a civil lawsuit within one year from the date that the DFEH issues a “right-to-sue” notice to the employee. (Gov. Code, §12965, subd. (b).)
Right to Sue After One Year of Filing With DFEH
An employee’s right to sue arises by operation of law when the Department of Fair Employment and Housing fails to resolve the matter within one year from the time the employee first filed an administrative complaint for discrimination. The employee’s failure to obtain a second right to sue letter does not preclude a finding that the employee exhausted all required administrative remedies. (Grant v. Comp USA, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 637.)
Back pay restores a plaintiff in an employment discrimination case to the position he or she would have occupied but for the discrimination. (Lozada v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1139.)
Front pay as the term is used in employment litigation, is a measure of damages for loss of future income, as opposed to backpay, which is lost-wages damages through the time of trial. If the judge orders reinstatement of a fired employee, front pay might be awarded to make up a wage differential if there were no vacancy into which the employee could immediately be reinstated or promoted. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359.)